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From the same journal

First do no harm – The impact of financial incentives on dental x-rays

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First do no harm – The impact of financial incentives on dental x-rays. / Chalkley, Martin John; Listl, Stefan.

In: Journal of Health Economics, 29.01.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Chalkley, MJ & Listl, S 2018, 'First do no harm – The impact of financial incentives on dental x-rays', Journal of Health Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.12.005

APA

Chalkley, M. J., & Listl, S. (2018). First do no harm – The impact of financial incentives on dental x-rays. Journal of Health Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.12.005

Vancouver

Chalkley MJ, Listl S. First do no harm – The impact of financial incentives on dental x-rays. Journal of Health Economics. 2018 Jan 29. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.12.005

Author

Chalkley, Martin John ; Listl, Stefan. / First do no harm – The impact of financial incentives on dental x-rays. In: Journal of Health Economics. 2018.

Bibtex - Download

@article{d3aa4f3fd30c48719dcb9d82c3ddc559,
title = "First do no harm – The impact of financial incentives on dental x-rays",
abstract = "This article assesses the impact of dentist remuneration on the incidence of potentially harmful dental x-rays. We use unique panel data which provide details of 1.3 million treatment claims by Scottish NHS dentists made between 1998 and 2007. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of both patients and dentists we estimate a series of fixed-effects models that are informed by a theoretical model of x-ray delivery and identify the effects on dental x-raying of dentists moving from a fixed salary to fee-for-service and patients moving from co-payment to exemption. We establish that there are significant increases in x-rays when dentists receive fee-for-service rather than salary payments and when patients are made exempt from payment.",
author = "Chalkley, {Martin John} and Stefan Listl",
note = "{\circledC} 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.",
year = "2018",
month = "1",
day = "29",
doi = "10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.12.005",
language = "English",
journal = "Journal of Health Economics",
issn = "0167-6296",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - First do no harm – The impact of financial incentives on dental x-rays

AU - Chalkley, Martin John

AU - Listl, Stefan

N1 - © 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.

PY - 2018/1/29

Y1 - 2018/1/29

N2 - This article assesses the impact of dentist remuneration on the incidence of potentially harmful dental x-rays. We use unique panel data which provide details of 1.3 million treatment claims by Scottish NHS dentists made between 1998 and 2007. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of both patients and dentists we estimate a series of fixed-effects models that are informed by a theoretical model of x-ray delivery and identify the effects on dental x-raying of dentists moving from a fixed salary to fee-for-service and patients moving from co-payment to exemption. We establish that there are significant increases in x-rays when dentists receive fee-for-service rather than salary payments and when patients are made exempt from payment.

AB - This article assesses the impact of dentist remuneration on the incidence of potentially harmful dental x-rays. We use unique panel data which provide details of 1.3 million treatment claims by Scottish NHS dentists made between 1998 and 2007. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of both patients and dentists we estimate a series of fixed-effects models that are informed by a theoretical model of x-ray delivery and identify the effects on dental x-raying of dentists moving from a fixed salary to fee-for-service and patients moving from co-payment to exemption. We establish that there are significant increases in x-rays when dentists receive fee-for-service rather than salary payments and when patients are made exempt from payment.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.12.005

DO - 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.12.005

M3 - Article

JO - Journal of Health Economics

T2 - Journal of Health Economics

JF - Journal of Health Economics

SN - 0167-6296

ER -