Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive

Richard Yetter Chappell

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00075.x

Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive

Richard Yetter Chappell

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper draws on the ‘Fitting Attitudes’ analysis of value to argue that we should take the concept of fittingness (rather than value) as our normative primitive. I will argue that the fittingness framework enhances the clarity and expressive power of our normative theorising. Along the way, we will see how the fittingness framework illuminates our understanding of various moral theories, and why it casts doubt on the Global Consequentialist idea that acts and (say) eye colours are normatively on a par. We will see why even consequentialists, in taking rightness to be in some sense determined by goodness, should not think that rightness is conceptually reducible to goodness. Finally, I will use the fittingness framework to explicate the distinction between consequentialist and deontological theories, with particular attention to the contentious case of Rule Consequentialism.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	684-704
Journal	Philosophical quarterly
Volume	62
Issue number	249
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00075.x
Publication status	Published - 2012

Bibliographical note

©2012 The Author, The Philosophical Quarterly, © 2012 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details

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10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00075.x

Chappell-Fittingness
©2012 The Author, The Philosophical Quarterly, © 2012 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details
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Cite this

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abstract = "This paper draws on the {\textquoteleft}Fitting Attitudes{\textquoteright} analysis of value to argue that we should take the concept of fittingness (rather than value) as our normative primitive. I will argue that the fittingness framework enhances the clarity and expressive power of our normative theorising. Along the way, we will see how the fittingness framework illuminates our understanding of various moral theories, and why it casts doubt on the Global Consequentialist idea that acts and (say) eye colours are normatively on a par. We will see why even consequentialists, in taking rightness to be in some sense determined by goodness, should not think that rightness is conceptually reducible to goodness. Finally, I will use the fittingness framework to explicate the distinction between consequentialist and deontological theories, with particular attention to the contentious case of Rule Consequentialism.",

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