Folk intuitions about the causal theory of perception

Pendaran Roberts; Keith Malcolm Allen; Kelly Schmidtke

Folk intuitions about the causal theory of perception

Pendaran Roberts, Keith Malcolm Allen, Kelly Schmidtke

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

It is widely held by philosophers not only that is there a causal condition on perception but also that the causal condition is a conceptual truth about perception. One influential line of argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to a style of thought experiment popularized by Grice. Given the significance of these thought experiments to the literature, it is important to see whether the folk in fact respond to these cases in the way that philosophers assume they should. We test folk intuitions regarding the causal theory of perception by asking our participants to what extent they agree that they would ‘see’ an object in various Gricean scenarios. We find that the intuitions of the folk do not strongly support the causal condition; they at most strongly support a ‘no blocker’ condition. We argue that this is problematic for the claim that the causal condition is a conceptual truth.

Original language	English
Journal	Ergo
Publication status	Published - 8 Feb 2017

Keywords

Perception
Experimental Philosophy
Causal theory of perception

Access to Document

Folk intuitions about the causal theory of perception (Ergo, final version for proofing)Accepted author manuscript, 583 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Cite this

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title = "Folk intuitions about the causal theory of perception",

abstract = "It is widely held by philosophers not only that is there a causal condition on perception but also that the causal condition is a conceptual truth about perception. One influential line of argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to a style of thought experiment popularized by Grice. Given the significance of these thought experiments to the literature, it is important to see whether the folk in fact respond to these cases in the way that philosophers assume they should. We test folk intuitions regarding the causal theory of perception by asking our participants to what extent they agree that they would {\textquoteleft}see{\textquoteright} an object in various Gricean scenarios. We find that the intuitions of the folk do not strongly support the causal condition; they at most strongly support a {\textquoteleft}no blocker{\textquoteright} condition. We argue that this is problematic for the claim that the causal condition is a conceptual truth. ",

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AU - Schmidtke, Kelly

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AB - It is widely held by philosophers not only that is there a causal condition on perception but also that the causal condition is a conceptual truth about perception. One influential line of argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to a style of thought experiment popularized by Grice. Given the significance of these thought experiments to the literature, it is important to see whether the folk in fact respond to these cases in the way that philosophers assume they should. We test folk intuitions regarding the causal theory of perception by asking our participants to what extent they agree that they would ‘see’ an object in various Gricean scenarios. We find that the intuitions of the folk do not strongly support the causal condition; they at most strongly support a ‘no blocker’ condition. We argue that this is problematic for the claim that the causal condition is a conceptual truth.

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KW - Experimental Philosophy

KW - Causal theory of perception

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