Abstract
We propose a novel explanation for why sanctions on Russian firms might not work as intended: these firms’ ability to diversify sanction risks via partner countries friendly with Russia. Using indirect links with partner firms as a plausibly exogenous proxy for this risk-sharing channel, we show that exposed Russian firms were able to leverage these links to alleviate the negative impacts of sanctions in 2014.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 112005 |
Number of pages | 5 |
Journal | Economics Letters |
Volume | 244 |
Early online date | 10 Oct 2024 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 10 Oct 2024 |
Bibliographical note
© 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.Keywords
- International risk-sharing
- Sanction
- Russia
- Firm-level