Generalized Cumulative Offer Processes

Jorgen Kratz, Makoto Shimoji, Inacio Bo*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In the context of the matching-with-contracts model, we generalize the cumulative offer process to allow for arbitrary subsets of doctors to make proposals in each round. We show that, under a condition on the hospitals' choice functions, the outcome of this generalized cumulative offer process is independent of the sets of doctors making proposals in each round. The flexibility of the resulting model allows it to be used to describe different dynamic processes and their final outcomes.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages21
JournalREVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN
Early online date10 Apr 2024
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 10 Apr 2024

Bibliographical note

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2024. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the University’s Research Publications and Open Access policy.

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