Abstract
We study the effects of a hospital merger in a spatial competition framework where semi-altruistic hospitals choose quality and cost-containment effort. Whereas a merger always leads to higher average cost efficiency, the effect on quality provision depends on the strategic nature of quality competition, which in turn depends on the degree of altruism and the effectiveness of cost-containment effort. If qualities are strategic complements, then a merger leads to lower quality for all hospitals. If qualities are strategic substitutes, then a merger leads to higher quality for at least one hospital, and might also yield higher average quality provision and increased patient utility.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 597–627 |
| Number of pages | 31 |
| Journal | Scandinavian Journal of Economics |
| Volume | 119 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 16 May 2017 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 29 Jun 2017 |
Bibliographical note
Date of Acceptance: 09/12/2015. Embargo period: 24 months. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for detailsKeywords
- Antitrust
- I11
- I18
- L13
- L44
- cost efficiency
- hospital mergers
- quality competition
