By the same authors

From the same journal

From the same journal

How to share it out: the value of information in teams

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Standard

How to share it out : the value of information in teams. / Gershkov, Alex; Li, Jianpei; Schweinzer, Paul.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 162, 03.2016, p. 261-304.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Gershkov, A, Li, J & Schweinzer, P 2016, 'How to share it out: the value of information in teams', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 162, pp. 261-304. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.013

APA

Gershkov, A., Li, J., & Schweinzer, P. (2016). How to share it out: the value of information in teams. Journal of Economic Theory, 162, 261-304. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.013

Vancouver

Gershkov A, Li J, Schweinzer P. How to share it out: the value of information in teams. Journal of Economic Theory. 2016 Mar;162:261-304. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.013

Author

Gershkov, Alex ; Li, Jianpei ; Schweinzer, Paul. / How to share it out : the value of information in teams. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2016 ; Vol. 162. pp. 261-304.

Bibtex - Download

@article{3f26f37e84a54959b1da41cd6a70d8d6,
title = "How to share it out: the value of information in teams",
abstract = "We study the role of information exchange, leadership and coordination in team or partnership structures. For this purpose, we view individuals jointly engaging in productive processes -- a 'team' -- as endowed with individual and privately held information on the joint production process. Once individual information is shared, team members decide individually on the effort they exert in the joint production process. This effort, however, is not contractible; only the joint output (or profit) of the team can be observed. Our central question is whether or not incentives can be provided to a team in this environment such that team members communicate their private information and exert efficient productive efforts on the basis of this communication. Our main result shows that there exists a simple ranking-based contract which implements both desiderata in a wide set of situations.",
keywords = "Moral hazard, Adverse selection, Leadership, Teams",
author = "Alex Gershkov and Jianpei Li and Paul Schweinzer",
year = "2016",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.013",
language = "English",
volume = "162",
pages = "261--304",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - How to share it out

T2 - the value of information in teams

AU - Gershkov, Alex

AU - Li, Jianpei

AU - Schweinzer, Paul

PY - 2016/3

Y1 - 2016/3

N2 - We study the role of information exchange, leadership and coordination in team or partnership structures. For this purpose, we view individuals jointly engaging in productive processes -- a 'team' -- as endowed with individual and privately held information on the joint production process. Once individual information is shared, team members decide individually on the effort they exert in the joint production process. This effort, however, is not contractible; only the joint output (or profit) of the team can be observed. Our central question is whether or not incentives can be provided to a team in this environment such that team members communicate their private information and exert efficient productive efforts on the basis of this communication. Our main result shows that there exists a simple ranking-based contract which implements both desiderata in a wide set of situations.

AB - We study the role of information exchange, leadership and coordination in team or partnership structures. For this purpose, we view individuals jointly engaging in productive processes -- a 'team' -- as endowed with individual and privately held information on the joint production process. Once individual information is shared, team members decide individually on the effort they exert in the joint production process. This effort, however, is not contractible; only the joint output (or profit) of the team can be observed. Our central question is whether or not incentives can be provided to a team in this environment such that team members communicate their private information and exert efficient productive efforts on the basis of this communication. Our main result shows that there exists a simple ranking-based contract which implements both desiderata in a wide set of situations.

KW - Moral hazard

KW - Adverse selection

KW - Leadership

KW - Teams

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.013

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.013

M3 - Article

VL - 162

SP - 261

EP - 304

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

ER -