Abstract
In a recent article, Hofweber (2019) presents a new, and surprising, argument for idealism. His argument is surprising because it starts with an apparently innocent premiss from the philosophy of language: that ‘that’-clauses do not refer. I do not think that Hofweber's argument works, and my first aim in this paper is to explain why. However, I agree with Hofweber that what we say about ‘that’-clauses has important metaphysical consequences. My second aim is to argue that, far from leading us into idealism, denying that ‘that’-clauses refer is the first step toward a kind of direct realism about belief.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-25 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | Mind |
Early online date | 6 Feb 2020 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 6 Feb 2020 |