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Idealism and the Identity Theory of Truth

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Publication details

DateAccepted/In press - 25 Nov 2019
DateE-pub ahead of print (current) - 6 Feb 2020
Number of pages25
Pages (from-to)1-25
Early online date6/02/20
Original languageEnglish


In a recent article, Hofweber (2019) presents a new, and surprising, argument for idealism. His argument is surprising because it starts with an apparently innocent premiss from the philosophy of language: that ‘that’-clauses do not refer. I do not think that Hofweber's argument works, and my first aim in this paper is to explain why. However, I agree with Hofweber that what we say about ‘that’-clauses has important metaphysical consequences. My second aim is to argue that, far from leading us into idealism, denying that ‘that’-clauses refer is the first step toward a kind of direct realism about belief.

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© Trueman, 2019. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.

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