Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: A Generalized Bidding Approach

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JournalEconomic Theory
DatePublished - May 2009
Issue number2
Volume39
Number of pages24
Pages (from-to)307-330
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games. We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer. The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer. The Shapley, consensus and equal surplus values are implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as power shifts away from the proposer to the rest of the players. Moreover, an alternative informational structure where these solution concepts can be implemented without imposing any conditions of the transferable utility game is discussed as well.

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M1 - 2

    Research areas

  • Implementation, Bidding mechanism, Shapley value, Consensus value, Equal surplus value, NONCOOPERATIVE APPROACH, SHAPLEY VALUE, OWEN VALUE, BANKRUPTCY, GAMES, EXTERNALITIES, RENEGOTIATION, ALLOCATION, NUCLEOLUS, SURPLUS

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