In defence of honour? A case for moral rights from relational autonomy

Hannah Maeve Carnegy-Arbuthnott

In defence of honour? A case for moral rights from relational autonomy

Philosophy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter (peer-reviewed) › peer-review

Abstract

Moral rights constrain the economic element of property rights in works of art by giving authors certain inalienable rights of control over their creations. Such moral rights have often been defended by appeal to the value of the relation between the author and their work, with arguments emphasising that moral rights serve to protect the personality of the author. This chapter argues that personality-based approaches provide a more limited justification for moral rights than they have typically been taken to yield. It suggests an alternative defence of moral rights, by drawing on insights from theories which emphasise the relational dimensions of autonomy.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Moral Rights
Editors	Ysolde Gendreau
Publisher	Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Pages	2-14
Number of pages	13
ISBN (Electronic)	9781789904871
ISBN (Print)	9781789904864
Publication status	Published - 12 Sept 2023

Bibliographical note

This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details

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Philosophical issues in moral rights2-1-ed
This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details
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In defence of honour? A case for moral rights from relational autonomy

Abstract

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