In Defence of My Favourite Theory

Johan Gustafsson, Olle Torpman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


One of the principles on how to act under moral uncertainty, My Favourite Theory, says roughly that a morally conscientious agent chooses an option that is permitted by the most credible moral theory. In defence of this principle, we argue that it prescribes consistent choices over time, without relying on intertheoretic comparisons of value, while its main rivals are either plagued by moral analogues of money pumps or in need of a method for making non-arbitrary intertheoretic comparisons. We rebut the arguments that have been levelled against My Favourite Theory and offer some arguments against intertheoretic comparisons of value.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)159-174
Number of pages16
JournalPacific philosophical quarterly
Issue number2
Early online date3 Mar 2014
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2014

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