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Incentives for Dentists in Public Service: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

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Incentives for Dentists in Public Service : Evidence from a Natural Experiment. / Chalkley, Martin; Tilley, Colin; Young, Linda; Bonetti, Debbie; Clarkson, Jan.

In: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY, Vol. 20, No. SUPPL. 2, 07.2010, p. I207-I223.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Chalkley, M, Tilley, C, Young, L, Bonetti, D & Clarkson, J 2010, 'Incentives for Dentists in Public Service: Evidence from a Natural Experiment', JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY, vol. 20, no. SUPPL. 2, pp. I207-I223. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muq025

APA

Chalkley, M., Tilley, C., Young, L., Bonetti, D., & Clarkson, J. (2010). Incentives for Dentists in Public Service: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY, 20(SUPPL. 2), I207-I223. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muq025

Vancouver

Chalkley M, Tilley C, Young L, Bonetti D, Clarkson J. Incentives for Dentists in Public Service: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY. 2010 Jul;20(SUPPL. 2):I207-I223. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muq025

Author

Chalkley, Martin ; Tilley, Colin ; Young, Linda ; Bonetti, Debbie ; Clarkson, Jan. / Incentives for Dentists in Public Service : Evidence from a Natural Experiment. In: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY. 2010 ; Vol. 20, No. SUPPL. 2. pp. I207-I223.

Bibtex - Download

@article{812a36f8908f48ef9a04f71f5cab4e74,
title = "Incentives for Dentists in Public Service: Evidence from a Natural Experiment",
abstract = "How can independent physician contractors be motivated to contribute to public service health care? We consider evidence, derived from a natural experiment in the UK publicly funded dental care system, concerning the efficacy of using a contractual mechanism that provides explicit rewards for increased service provision against the alternative of offering an employment-like relationship. We find that dentists who were moved from quasi-employment to an activity-based incentive contract increased their activity in the publicly funded service by 26%. We also find and quantify evidence of considerable variation between suppliers, which suggests that factors such as an individual's intrinsic motivation, professional standards, and preferences are important moderators of financial incentives.",
keywords = "NATIONAL-HEALTH-SERVICE, DENTAL-CARE, CHILDREN, ACCESS, MOTIVATION, MEDICAID, BEHAVIOR, QUALITY, PRIVATE, KNIGHTS",
author = "Martin Chalkley and Colin Tilley and Linda Young and Debbie Bonetti and Jan Clarkson",
year = "2010",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1093/jopart/muq025",
language = "English",
volume = "20",
pages = "I207--I223",
journal = "JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY",
issn = "1053-1858",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "SUPPL. 2",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Incentives for Dentists in Public Service

T2 - Evidence from a Natural Experiment

AU - Chalkley, Martin

AU - Tilley, Colin

AU - Young, Linda

AU - Bonetti, Debbie

AU - Clarkson, Jan

PY - 2010/7

Y1 - 2010/7

N2 - How can independent physician contractors be motivated to contribute to public service health care? We consider evidence, derived from a natural experiment in the UK publicly funded dental care system, concerning the efficacy of using a contractual mechanism that provides explicit rewards for increased service provision against the alternative of offering an employment-like relationship. We find that dentists who were moved from quasi-employment to an activity-based incentive contract increased their activity in the publicly funded service by 26%. We also find and quantify evidence of considerable variation between suppliers, which suggests that factors such as an individual's intrinsic motivation, professional standards, and preferences are important moderators of financial incentives.

AB - How can independent physician contractors be motivated to contribute to public service health care? We consider evidence, derived from a natural experiment in the UK publicly funded dental care system, concerning the efficacy of using a contractual mechanism that provides explicit rewards for increased service provision against the alternative of offering an employment-like relationship. We find that dentists who were moved from quasi-employment to an activity-based incentive contract increased their activity in the publicly funded service by 26%. We also find and quantify evidence of considerable variation between suppliers, which suggests that factors such as an individual's intrinsic motivation, professional standards, and preferences are important moderators of financial incentives.

KW - NATIONAL-HEALTH-SERVICE

KW - DENTAL-CARE

KW - CHILDREN

KW - ACCESS

KW - MOTIVATION

KW - MEDICAID

KW - BEHAVIOR

KW - QUALITY

KW - PRIVATE

KW - KNIGHTS

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77954367806&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/jopart/muq025

DO - 10.1093/jopart/muq025

M3 - Article

VL - 20

SP - I207-I223

JO - JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY

JF - JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY

SN - 1053-1858

IS - SUPPL. 2

ER -