'Incommensurability' and vagueness: Is the vagueness view defensible?

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'Incommensurability' and vagueness : Is the vagueness view defensible? / Qizilbash, Mozaffar Ali Khan.

In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2014, p. 141-153.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Qizilbash, MAK 2014, ''Incommensurability' and vagueness: Is the vagueness view defensible?', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 141-153. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9426-3

APA

Qizilbash, M. A. K. (2014). 'Incommensurability' and vagueness: Is the vagueness view defensible? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 17(1), 141-153. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9426-3

Vancouver

Qizilbash MAK. 'Incommensurability' and vagueness: Is the vagueness view defensible? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 2014;17(1):141-153. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9426-3

Author

Qizilbash, Mozaffar Ali Khan. / 'Incommensurability' and vagueness : Is the vagueness view defensible?. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 2014 ; Vol. 17, No. 1. pp. 141-153.

Bibtex - Download

@article{e8032e319be34fe0ad7f711fee61b672,
title = "'Incommensurability' and vagueness: Is the vagueness view defensible?",
abstract = "The vagueness view holds that when evaluative comparisons are hard, there is indeterminacy about which comparative relation holds. It is sceptical about whether there are any incommensurate items (in some domain). The sceptical element of John Broome’s version of this view rests on a controversial principle. Robert Sugden advances a similar view which does not depend on this principle. Sugden’s argument fails as a vagueness view because it assumes rather than shows that there are no incommensurate items (in some domain). Nonetheless, I argue that an interpretation of his argument constitutes a defensible vagueness view which is supported by intuition about examples. On this interpretation Sugden’s view can be mapped onto Broome’s application of a supervaluationist view of vagueness. It is also (on this reading) a close relative of James Griffin’s ‘rough equality’ view when this is interpreted in terms of vagueness. On an alternative interpretation Sugden’s view is not sceptical about incommensurateness. On this interpretation he does not defend a vagueness view and is ‘sceptical’ about the contribution of the philosophical literature to our understanding of rational choice.",
author = "Qizilbash, {Mozaffar Ali Khan}",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1007/s10677-013-9426-3",
language = "English",
volume = "17",
pages = "141--153",
journal = "Ethical Theory and Moral Practice",
issn = "1386-2820",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "1",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - 'Incommensurability' and vagueness

T2 - Is the vagueness view defensible?

AU - Qizilbash, Mozaffar Ali Khan

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - The vagueness view holds that when evaluative comparisons are hard, there is indeterminacy about which comparative relation holds. It is sceptical about whether there are any incommensurate items (in some domain). The sceptical element of John Broome’s version of this view rests on a controversial principle. Robert Sugden advances a similar view which does not depend on this principle. Sugden’s argument fails as a vagueness view because it assumes rather than shows that there are no incommensurate items (in some domain). Nonetheless, I argue that an interpretation of his argument constitutes a defensible vagueness view which is supported by intuition about examples. On this interpretation Sugden’s view can be mapped onto Broome’s application of a supervaluationist view of vagueness. It is also (on this reading) a close relative of James Griffin’s ‘rough equality’ view when this is interpreted in terms of vagueness. On an alternative interpretation Sugden’s view is not sceptical about incommensurateness. On this interpretation he does not defend a vagueness view and is ‘sceptical’ about the contribution of the philosophical literature to our understanding of rational choice.

AB - The vagueness view holds that when evaluative comparisons are hard, there is indeterminacy about which comparative relation holds. It is sceptical about whether there are any incommensurate items (in some domain). The sceptical element of John Broome’s version of this view rests on a controversial principle. Robert Sugden advances a similar view which does not depend on this principle. Sugden’s argument fails as a vagueness view because it assumes rather than shows that there are no incommensurate items (in some domain). Nonetheless, I argue that an interpretation of his argument constitutes a defensible vagueness view which is supported by intuition about examples. On this interpretation Sugden’s view can be mapped onto Broome’s application of a supervaluationist view of vagueness. It is also (on this reading) a close relative of James Griffin’s ‘rough equality’ view when this is interpreted in terms of vagueness. On an alternative interpretation Sugden’s view is not sceptical about incommensurateness. On this interpretation he does not defend a vagueness view and is ‘sceptical’ about the contribution of the philosophical literature to our understanding of rational choice.

U2 - 10.1007/s10677-013-9426-3

DO - 10.1007/s10677-013-9426-3

M3 - Article

VL - 17

SP - 141

EP - 153

JO - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

JF - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

SN - 1386-2820

IS - 1

ER -