Abstract
In this article, I argue that the small-improvement argument fails since some of the comparisons involved in the argument might be indeterminate. I defend this view from two objections by Ruth Chang, namely the argument from phenomenology and the argument from perplexity. There are some other objections to the small-improvement argument that also hinge on claims about indeterminacy. John Broome argues that alleged cases of value incomparability are merely examples of indeterminacy in the betterness relation. The main premiss of his argument is the much-discussed collapsing principle. I offer a new counterexample to this principle and argue that Broome’s defence of the principle is not cogent. On the other hand, Nicolas Espinoza argues that the small-improvement argument fails as a result of the mere possibility of evaluative indeterminacy. I argue that his objection is unsuccessful.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 433-445 |
| Journal | Utilitas |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 22 Jul 2013 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2013 |