Activities per year
Abstract
This paper analyzes the political economics of the composition of taxes. Taxes may be levied on income, or on expenditure, and the median voter is pivotal in the theoretical framework analyzed. As in Meltzer and Richard (1981) income taxes increase with inequality. Conversely expenditure taxes first increase and then decrease with increasing inequality. The extent to which taxes are levied on income relative to expenditure unambiguously rises with inequality. Cross-country data exhibit a robust positive correlation between the extent to which taxes are levied on income relative to expenditure, and inequality. Consistent with the theory this relationship holds most significantly in stronger democracies.
Original language | English |
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Publisher | Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York |
Pages | 1-36 |
Number of pages | 36 |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2015 |
Publication series
Name | University of York Department of Economics Discussion Papers in Economics |
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Keywords
- tax structure
- inequality
Activities
- 1 Invited talk
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Seminar in the Department of Economics, University of Fribourg
Andrew Christopher Pickering (Invited speaker)
30 Apr 2015Activity: Talk or presentation › Invited talk