TY - GEN
T1 - Inter-operator dynamic capacity sharing for multi-tenant virtualized PON
AU - Afraz, Nima
AU - Elrasad, Amr
AU - Ahmadi, Hamed
AU - Ruffini, Marco
PY - 2018/2/14
Y1 - 2018/2/14
N2 - As the capacity of the optical access networks increases, the case for sharing this capacity amongst multiple operators becomes stronger. In addition to the capital and operating expenditure savings that infrastructure sharing can provide for the operators, providing a higher degree of infrastructure customization will be a strong motivator for operators to participate in the sharing ecosystem. Thanks to the network virtualization technologies, the higher degree of control over the infrastructure can be a motivator for the new virtual operators to join. Given this control, each operator will make decisions for their share of the resources according to their policies. However, when it comes to the infrastructure provider to aggregate all these decisions, ensuring trust becomes vital. It is essential to study the incentives of all the operators and design a sharing mechanism that incentivizes truthfulness. In this paper, we propose such an auction mechanism to monetize the exchange of excess capacity between network operators to increase resource efficiency. The proposed market design is based on a sealed-bid VCG auction for homogeneous multi-item goods with a reserve price. Through market simulations, we show that our proposed market design can achieve all the fundamental economic properties of a market including, truthful value announcing, individual rationality and weak budget balance.
AB - As the capacity of the optical access networks increases, the case for sharing this capacity amongst multiple operators becomes stronger. In addition to the capital and operating expenditure savings that infrastructure sharing can provide for the operators, providing a higher degree of infrastructure customization will be a strong motivator for operators to participate in the sharing ecosystem. Thanks to the network virtualization technologies, the higher degree of control over the infrastructure can be a motivator for the new virtual operators to join. Given this control, each operator will make decisions for their share of the resources according to their policies. However, when it comes to the infrastructure provider to aggregate all these decisions, ensuring trust becomes vital. It is essential to study the incentives of all the operators and design a sharing mechanism that incentivizes truthfulness. In this paper, we propose such an auction mechanism to monetize the exchange of excess capacity between network operators to increase resource efficiency. The proposed market design is based on a sealed-bid VCG auction for homogeneous multi-item goods with a reserve price. Through market simulations, we show that our proposed market design can achieve all the fundamental economic properties of a market including, truthful value announcing, individual rationality and weak budget balance.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85045264970&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/PIMRC.2017.8292715
DO - 10.1109/PIMRC.2017.8292715
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85045264970
T3 - IEEE International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, PIMRC
SP - 1
EP - 6
BT - 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications
PB - IEEE
T2 - 28th Annual IEEE International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, PIMRC 2017
Y2 - 8 October 2017 through 13 October 2017
ER -