Abstract
Inter-species variation in colour perception poses a serious problem for the view that colours are mind-independent properties. Given that colour perception varies so drastically across species, which species perceives colours as they really are? In this paper, I argue that all do. Specifically, I argue that members of different species perceive properties that are determinates of different, mutually compatible, determinables. This is an instance of a general selectionist strategy for dealing with cases of perceptual variation. According to selectionist views, objects simultaneously instantiate a plurality of colours, all of them genuinely mind-independent, and subjects select from amongst this plurality which colours they perceive. I contrast selectionist views with relationalist views that deny the mind-independence of colour, and consider some general objections to this strategy.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 197-220 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | Philosophical Studies |
| Volume | 142 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2009 |
Bibliographical note
© 2009 Springer Verlag. This is an author produced version of a paper published in PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self archiving policy.Keywords
- Colour
- Colour perception
- Perceptual variation
- Selectionism
- REALISM
- VISION