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International trade and the incentive for merger

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JournalApplied economics
DatePublished - May 2011
Issue number13
Volume43
Number of pages5
Pages (from-to)1673-1677
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

This article examines the profitability of horizontal merger in an open economy with Cournot competition. We find that duopoly is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for domestic merger to be profitable. A cross-border merger, however, can be profitable from any market structure.

    Research areas

  • HORIZONTAL MERGER, EQUILIBRIUM

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