International trade and the incentive for merger

Martin Chalkley; Geoff Stewart

doi:10.1080/00036840903527171

International trade and the incentive for merger

Martin Chalkley, Geoff Stewart

Centre for Health Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This article examines the profitability of horizontal merger in an open economy with Cournot competition. We find that duopoly is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for domestic merger to be profitable. A cross-border merger, however, can be profitable from any market structure.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1673-1677
Number of pages	5
Journal	Applied Economics
Volume	43
Issue number	13
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840903527171
Publication status	Published - May 2011

Keywords

HORIZONTAL MERGER
EQUILIBRIUM

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10.1080/00036840903527171

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International trade and the incentive for merger

Abstract

Keywords

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