Abstract
This paper sets out to explain the preferences of the seven northern euro area member states on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) concerning the threshold set for direct European Central Bank (ECB) control over bank supervision. Building on the concept of the ‘financial trilemma’, it argues that different bank internationalisation patterns in the seven northern member states explain different preferences on the transfer of supervisory powers over less significant banks to the ECB. In particular, the reach of internationalisation into a national banking system – notably the extent to which even smaller banks were exposed to foreign banking operations – is shown to be the core factor explaining different national preferences on threshold. In the five countries with a large number of small and parochial alternative (cooperative and savings) banks, it is necessary to examine the system-specific structures of these banks to explain better the reach of internationalisation and national preferences on the threshold. Determined German opposition to ECB supervision of smaller alternative banks is juxtaposed with either less hostile or more positive support of at least four other countries despite the important presence of small alternative banks.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 438-461 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | West European Politics |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 8 Mar 2016 |
Bibliographical note
© 2016, Taylor & Francis. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details. Embargo period : 18 monthsKeywords
- banking supervision
- banking system
- Banking union
- Economic and Monetary Union
- Single Supervisory Mechanism
- SSM