Is Objective Act Consequentialism Satisfiable?

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A compelling requirement on normative theories is that they should be satisfiable, that is, in every possible choice situation with a finite number of alternatives, there should be at least one performable act such that, if one were to perform that act, one would comply with the theory. In this paper, I argue that, given some standard assumptions about free will and counterfactuals, Objective Act Consequentialism violates this requirement.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)193-202
Number of pages10
Issue number2
Early online date27 Jul 2018
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2019

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