Is Objective Act Consequentialism Satisfiable?

TY - JOUR

T1 - Is Objective Act Consequentialism Satisfiable?

AU - Gustafsson, Carl Johan Eric

N1 - This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details

PY - 2019/4

Y1 - 2019/4

N2 - A compelling requirement on normative theories is that they should be satisfiable, that is, in every possible choice situation with a finite number of alternatives, there should be at least one performable act such that, if one were to perform that act, one would comply with the theory. In this paper, I argue that, given some standard assumptions about free will and counterfactuals, Objective Act Consequentialism violates this requirement.

AB - A compelling requirement on normative theories is that they should be satisfiable, that is, in every possible choice situation with a finite number of alternatives, there should be at least one performable act such that, if one were to perform that act, one would comply with the theory. In this paper, I argue that, given some standard assumptions about free will and counterfactuals, Objective Act Consequentialism violates this requirement.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85067701124&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/analys/any026

DO - 10.1093/analys/any026

M3 - Article

SN - 0003-2638

VL - 79

SP - 193

EP - 202

JO - Analysis

JF - Analysis

IS - 2

ER -