Is Timothy Williamson a Necessary Existent?

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)


Timothy Williamson has offered an argument for the claim that, necessarily, he exists, that is, that he is a necessary existent. Though this argument has attracted a great deal of attention, I present a new argument for the same conclusion which reveals a new way of denying the soundness of Williamson’s argument, one which denies not only that it is necessary that he exists but also that there are any true necessities about Williamson at all. In conclusion, given that it is contingent that Williamson exists, I nevertheless distinguish a sense in which he is, after all, a necessary existent: Williamson necessarily exists, though it is not necessary that he exists.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationModality
Subtitle of host publicationMetaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology
EditorsBob Hale, Aviv Hoffman
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages11
ISBN (Print)9780199565818, 9780199671502
Publication statusPublished - 25 Mar 2010

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