Is Timothy Williamson a Necessary Existent?

TY - CHAP

T1 - Is Timothy Williamson a Necessary Existent?

AU - Efird, David

PY - 2010/3/25

Y1 - 2010/3/25

N2 - Timothy Williamson has offered an argument for the claim that, necessarily, he exists, that is, that he is a necessary existent. Though this argument has attracted a great deal of attention, I present a new argument for the same conclusion which reveals a new way of denying the soundness of Williamson’s argument, one which denies not only that it is necessary that he exists but also that there are any true necessities about Williamson at all. In conclusion, given that it is contingent that Williamson exists, I nevertheless distinguish a sense in which he is, after all, a necessary existent: Williamson necessarily exists, though it is not necessary that he exists.

AB - Timothy Williamson has offered an argument for the claim that, necessarily, he exists, that is, that he is a necessary existent. Though this argument has attracted a great deal of attention, I present a new argument for the same conclusion which reveals a new way of denying the soundness of Williamson’s argument, one which denies not only that it is necessary that he exists but also that there are any true necessities about Williamson at all. In conclusion, given that it is contingent that Williamson exists, I nevertheless distinguish a sense in which he is, after all, a necessary existent: Williamson necessarily exists, though it is not necessary that he exists.

U2 - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.001.0001

DO - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.001.0001

M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

SN - 9780199565818

SN - 9780199671502

SP - 97

EP - 107

BT - Modality

A2 - Hale, Bob

A2 - Hoffman, Aviv

PB - Oxford University Press

CY - Oxford

ER -