By the same authors

Is Timothy Williamson a Necessary Existent?

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)

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Title of host publicationModality
DatePublished - 25 Mar 2010
Pages97-107
Number of pages11
PublisherOxford University Press
Place of PublicationOxford
EditorsBob Hale, Aviv Hoffman
Original languageEnglish
ISBN (Print)9780199565818, 9780199671502

Abstract

Timothy Williamson has offered an argument for the claim that, necessarily, he exists, that is, that he is a necessary existent. Though this argument has attracted a great deal of attention, I present a new argument for the same conclusion which reveals a new way of denying the soundness of Williamson’s argument, one which denies not only that it is necessary that he exists but also that there are any true necessities about Williamson at all. In conclusion, given that it is contingent that Williamson exists, I nevertheless distinguish a sense in which he is, after all, a necessary existent: Williamson necessarily exists, though it is not necessary that he exists.

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