Projects per year
Abstract
Assurance cases (ACs) are often required to certify critical systems. The use of integrated formal methods (FMs) in assurance can improve automation, increase confidence, and overcome errant reasoning. However, ACs can rarely be fully formalised, as the use of FMs is contingent on models that are validated by informal processes. Consequently, assurance techniques should support both formal and informal artifacts, with explicated inferential links between them. In this paper, we contribute a formal machine-checked interactive language for the computer-assisted construction of ACs called Isabelle/SACM. The framework guarantees well-formedness, consistency, and traceability of ACs, and allows a tight integration of formal and informal evidence of various provenance. To validate Isabelle/SACM, we present a novel formalisation of the Tokeneer benchmark, verify its security requirements, and form a mechanised AC that combines the resulting formal and informal artifacts.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Integrated Formal Methods |
Subtitle of host publication | Proceedings of the 15th International Conference |
Publisher | Springer |
Pages | 379-398 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Volume | 11918 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9783030349684 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783030349677 |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 22 Nov 2019 |
Publication series
Name | LNCS |
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Publisher | Springer |
Bibliographical note
This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.Projects
- 1 Finished
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CyPhyAssure: CyPhyAssure: Compositional Safety Assurance for Cyber-Physical Systems
1/06/18 → 31/07/21
Project: Research project (funded) › Research