By the same authors

Isabelle/SACM: Computer-Assisted Assurance Cases with Integrated Formal Methods

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Title of host publicationIntegrated Formal Methods
DateAccepted/In press - 16 Sep 2019
Number of pages18
Original languageEnglish

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NameLNCS
PublisherSpringer

Abstract

Assurance cases (ACs) are often required to certify critical systems. The use of integrated formal methods (FMs) in assurance can improve automation, increase confidence, and overcome errant reasoning. However, ACs can rarely be fully formalised, as the use of FMs is contingent on models that are validated by informal processes. Consequently, assurance techniques should support both formal and informal artifacts, with explicated inferential links between them. In this paper, we contribute a formal machine-checked interactive language for the computer-assisted construction of ACs called Isabelle/SACM. The framework guarantees well-formedness, consistency, and traceability of ACs, and allows a tight integration of formal and informal evidence of various provenance. To validate Isabelle/SACM, we present a novel formalisation of the Tokeneer benchmark, verify its security requirements, and form a mechanised AC that combines the resulting formal and informal artifacts.

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