Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence

TY - JOUR

T1 - Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance

T2 - Experimental Evidence

AU - Lanari Bo, Inacio

AU - Hakimov, Rustamdjan

N1 - This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.

PY - 2020/2

Y1 - 2020/2

N2 - We test experimentally the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus two versions of the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), in which students make applications one at a time. A significantly higher proportion of stable outcomes is reached under IDAM than under DA. The difference can be explained by a higher proportion of subjects following an equilibrium truthful strategy under iterative mechanisms than the dominant strategy of truthful reporting under DA. We associate the benefits of iterative mechanisms with the feedback on the outcome of the previous application they provide to students between steps.

AB - We test experimentally the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus two versions of the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), in which students make applications one at a time. A significantly higher proportion of stable outcomes is reached under IDAM than under DA. The difference can be explained by a higher proportion of subjects following an equilibrium truthful strategy under iterative mechanisms than the dominant strategy of truthful reporting under DA. We associate the benefits of iterative mechanisms with the feedback on the outcome of the previous application they provide to students between steps.

U2 - 10.1093/ej/uez036

DO - 10.1093/ej/uez036

M3 - Article

SN - 0013-0133

VL - 130

SP - 356

EP - 392

JO - The Economic Journal

JF - The Economic Journal

IS - 626

ER -