Justifying Metaphysical Nihilism: A Response to Cameron

David Efird; Tom Stoneham

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.588.x

Justifying Metaphysical Nihilism: A Response to Cameron

David Efird, Tom Stoneham

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Ross Cameron charges the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism with equivocation: each premise is plausible only under different interpretations of 'concrete'. This charge is ungrounded; the argument is both valid and supported by basic modal intuitions.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	132-137
Number of pages	6
Journal	Philosophical quarterly
Volume	59
Issue number	234
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.588.x
Publication status	Published - Jan 2009

Keywords

SUBTRACTION ARGUMENT
MIGHT

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10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.588.x

Cite this

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abstract = "Ross Cameron charges the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism with equivocation: each premise is plausible only under different interpretations of 'concrete'. This charge is ungrounded; the argument is both valid and supported by basic modal intuitions.",

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Justifying Metaphysical Nihilism: A Response to Cameron

Abstract

Keywords

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