By the same authors

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From the same journal

Market Discipline and EU Corporate Governance Reform in the Banking Sector: Merits, Fallacies, and Cognitive Boundaries

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Standard

Market Discipline and EU Corporate Governance Reform in the Banking Sector : Merits, Fallacies, and Cognitive Boundaries. / Avgouleas, E.; Cullen, J.; Dignam, A (Editor); Galanis, M (Editor).

In: Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 41, No. 1, 18.02.2014, p. 28-50.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Avgouleas, E, Cullen, J, Dignam, A (ed.) & Galanis, M (ed.) 2014, 'Market Discipline and EU Corporate Governance Reform in the Banking Sector: Merits, Fallacies, and Cognitive Boundaries', Journal of Law and Society, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 28-50. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2014.00655.x

APA

Avgouleas, E., Cullen, J., Dignam, A. (Ed.), & Galanis, M. (Ed.) (2014). Market Discipline and EU Corporate Governance Reform in the Banking Sector: Merits, Fallacies, and Cognitive Boundaries. Journal of Law and Society, 41(1), 28-50. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2014.00655.x

Vancouver

Avgouleas E, Cullen J, Dignam A, (ed.), Galanis M, (ed.). Market Discipline and EU Corporate Governance Reform in the Banking Sector: Merits, Fallacies, and Cognitive Boundaries. Journal of Law and Society. 2014 Feb 18;41(1):28-50. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2014.00655.x

Author

Avgouleas, E. ; Cullen, J. ; Dignam, A (Editor) ; Galanis, M (Editor). / Market Discipline and EU Corporate Governance Reform in the Banking Sector : Merits, Fallacies, and Cognitive Boundaries. In: Journal of Law and Society. 2014 ; Vol. 41, No. 1. pp. 28-50.

Bibtex - Download

@article{3bcbeb28801b4364866178ef4e461266,
title = "Market Discipline and EU Corporate Governance Reform in the Banking Sector: Merits, Fallacies, and Cognitive Boundaries",
abstract = "Much contemporary analysis has concluded that the recent financial crisis and bank failures were, inter alia, the result of a breakdown in corporate governance regimes and market discipline. New EU regulations strongly advocate market-based remedies such as tighter investor monitoring and greater control over executives' remuneration, in order to safeguard financial stability. We argue that this approach largely ignores three very important aspects of modern financial markets that cannot be constrained through market discipline: (a) socio-psychological phenomena; (b) the epistemological properties of financial market innovation; and (c) the inherent inability of market participants to predict uncertain risk correlations. Therefore, this article argues that excessive EU focus on corporate governance reforms, as a means to improve financial stability, detracts attention from much more significant concerns, chiefly the issue of optimal bank structure.",
author = "E. Avgouleas and J. Cullen and A Dignam and M Galanis",
year = "2014",
month = feb,
day = "18",
doi = "10.1111/j.1467-6478.2014.00655.x",
language = "English",
volume = "41",
pages = "28--50",
journal = "Journal of Law and Society",
issn = "0263-323X",
publisher = "Wiley",
number = "1",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Market Discipline and EU Corporate Governance Reform in the Banking Sector

T2 - Merits, Fallacies, and Cognitive Boundaries

AU - Avgouleas, E.

AU - Cullen, J.

A2 - Dignam, A

A2 - Galanis, M

PY - 2014/2/18

Y1 - 2014/2/18

N2 - Much contemporary analysis has concluded that the recent financial crisis and bank failures were, inter alia, the result of a breakdown in corporate governance regimes and market discipline. New EU regulations strongly advocate market-based remedies such as tighter investor monitoring and greater control over executives' remuneration, in order to safeguard financial stability. We argue that this approach largely ignores three very important aspects of modern financial markets that cannot be constrained through market discipline: (a) socio-psychological phenomena; (b) the epistemological properties of financial market innovation; and (c) the inherent inability of market participants to predict uncertain risk correlations. Therefore, this article argues that excessive EU focus on corporate governance reforms, as a means to improve financial stability, detracts attention from much more significant concerns, chiefly the issue of optimal bank structure.

AB - Much contemporary analysis has concluded that the recent financial crisis and bank failures were, inter alia, the result of a breakdown in corporate governance regimes and market discipline. New EU regulations strongly advocate market-based remedies such as tighter investor monitoring and greater control over executives' remuneration, in order to safeguard financial stability. We argue that this approach largely ignores three very important aspects of modern financial markets that cannot be constrained through market discipline: (a) socio-psychological phenomena; (b) the epistemological properties of financial market innovation; and (c) the inherent inability of market participants to predict uncertain risk correlations. Therefore, this article argues that excessive EU focus on corporate governance reforms, as a means to improve financial stability, detracts attention from much more significant concerns, chiefly the issue of optimal bank structure.

U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-6478.2014.00655.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1467-6478.2014.00655.x

M3 - Article

VL - 41

SP - 28

EP - 50

JO - Journal of Law and Society

JF - Journal of Law and Society

SN - 0263-323X

IS - 1

ER -