Mathematics and Reality

TY - BOOK

T1 - Mathematics and Reality

AU - Leng, Mary

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - Mary Leng offers a defence of mathematical fictionalism, arguing that we have no reason to believe that there are any mathematical objects. In mounting this defence she responds to the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects, arguably the most pressing challenge that fictionalists must face. According to the indispensability argument, we ought to believe that there are such things as numbers, functions, and sets, since claims whose truth would require the existence of such things are indispensable in the formulation of our best scientific theories. In response to this argument, Leng offers an account of the role of mathematics in empirical science that does not assume that the mathematical hypotheses used in formulating our scientific theories are true.

AB - Mary Leng offers a defence of mathematical fictionalism, arguing that we have no reason to believe that there are any mathematical objects. In mounting this defence she responds to the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects, arguably the most pressing challenge that fictionalists must face. According to the indispensability argument, we ought to believe that there are such things as numbers, functions, and sets, since claims whose truth would require the existence of such things are indispensable in the formulation of our best scientific theories. In response to this argument, Leng offers an account of the role of mathematics in empirical science that does not assume that the mathematical hypotheses used in formulating our scientific theories are true.

KW - mathematics

KW - philosophy

KW - indispensability

KW - Quine

KW - Putnam

KW - fictionalism

KW - science

KW - realism

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=78649580671&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Book

SN - 978-0-19-967468-8

BT - Mathematics and Reality

PB - Oxford University Press

ER -