Model Based System Assurance Using the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel

TY - JOUR

T1 - Model Based System Assurance Using the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel

AU - Wei, Ran

AU - Kelly, Timothy Patrick

AU - Dai, Xiaotian

AU - Zhao, Shuai

AU - Hawkins, Richard David

N1 - © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy.

PY - 2019/8/1

Y1 - 2019/8/1

N2 - Assurance cases are used to demonstrate confidence in system properties of interest (e.g. safety and/or security). A number of system assurance approaches are adopted by industries in the safety-critical domain. However, the task of constructing assurance cases remains a manual, lenghty and informal process. The Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM)is a standard specified by the Object Management Group (OMG). SACM provides a richer set of features than existing system assurance languages/approaches. SACM provides a foundation for model-based system assurance, which bears great application potentials in growing technology domains such as Open Adaptive Systems. However, the intended usage of SACM has not been sufficiently explained. In addition, there has not been support to interoperate between existing assurance case (models)and SACM models. In this article, we explain the intended usage of SACM based on our involvement in the OMG specification process of SACM. In addition, to promote a model-based approach, we provide SACM compliant metamodels for existing system assurance approaches (the Goal Structuring Notation and Claims-Arguments-Evidence), and the transformations from these models to SACM. We also briefly discuss the tool support for model-based system assurance which helps practitioners make the transition from existing system assurance approaches to model-based system assurance using SACM.

AB - Assurance cases are used to demonstrate confidence in system properties of interest (e.g. safety and/or security). A number of system assurance approaches are adopted by industries in the safety-critical domain. However, the task of constructing assurance cases remains a manual, lenghty and informal process. The Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM)is a standard specified by the Object Management Group (OMG). SACM provides a richer set of features than existing system assurance languages/approaches. SACM provides a foundation for model-based system assurance, which bears great application potentials in growing technology domains such as Open Adaptive Systems. However, the intended usage of SACM has not been sufficiently explained. In addition, there has not been support to interoperate between existing assurance case (models)and SACM models. In this article, we explain the intended usage of SACM based on our involvement in the OMG specification process of SACM. In addition, to promote a model-based approach, we provide SACM compliant metamodels for existing system assurance approaches (the Goal Structuring Notation and Claims-Arguments-Evidence), and the transformations from these models to SACM. We also briefly discuss the tool support for model-based system assurance which helps practitioners make the transition from existing system assurance approaches to model-based system assurance using SACM.

KW - Claims-Arguments-Evidence

KW - Goal structuring notation

KW - Model based system assurance

KW - Model driven engineering

KW - Structured assurance case metamodel

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85065495606&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jss.2019.05.013

DO - 10.1016/j.jss.2019.05.013

M3 - Article

SN - 0164-1212

VL - 154

SP - 211

EP - 233

JO - Journal of Systems and Software

JF - Journal of Systems and Software

ER -