TY - JOUR
T1 - Moral Truth
T2 - Observational or Theoretical?
AU - Wilson, Catherine
PY - 2011/4
Y1 - 2011/4
N2 - Moral properties are widely held to be response-dependent properties of actions, situations, events and persons. There is controversy as to whether the putative response-dependence of these properties nullifies any truth-claims for moral judgements, or rather supports them. The present paper argues that moral judgements are more profitably compared with theoretical judgements in the natural sciences than with the judgements of immediate sense-perception. The notion of moral truth is dependent on the notion of moral knowledge, which in turn is best understood as a possible endpoint of theory change for the better.
AB - Moral properties are widely held to be response-dependent properties of actions, situations, events and persons. There is controversy as to whether the putative response-dependence of these properties nullifies any truth-claims for moral judgements, or rather supports them. The present paper argues that moral judgements are more profitably compared with theoretical judgements in the natural sciences than with the judgements of immediate sense-perception. The notion of moral truth is dependent on the notion of moral knowledge, which in turn is best understood as a possible endpoint of theory change for the better.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=80052449436&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00300.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00300.x
M3 - Article
SN - 0066-7374
VL - 111
SP - 95
EP - 112
JO - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
JF - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
IS - 1 PART 1
ER -