Nefarious Presentism

David Ingram; Jonathan Tallant

doi:10.1093/pq/pqu095

Nefarious Presentism

David Ingram, Jonathan Tallant

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival factions ‘upstanding’ and ‘nefarious’ presentists. Upstanding presentists aim to meet the challenge, positing presently existing truth-makers for truths about the past; nefarious presentists aim to shirk their responsibilities, using the language of truth-maker theory but without paying any ontological price. We argue that presentists should be nefarious presentists.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	355–371
Number of pages	17
Journal	The Philosophical Quarterly
Volume	65
Issue number	260
Early online date	25 Jun 2015
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu095
Publication status	Published - Jul 2015

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10.1093/pq/pqu095Licence: Unspecified

Cite this

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title = "Nefarious Presentism",

abstract = "Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival factions {\textquoteleft}upstanding{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}nefarious{\textquoteright} presentists. Upstanding presentists aim to meet the challenge, positing presently existing truth-makers for truths about the past; nefarious presentists aim to shirk their responsibilities, using the language of truth-maker theory but without paying any ontological price. We argue that presentists should be nefarious presentists.",

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