Nefarious Presentism

David Ingram, Jonathan Tallant

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival factions ‘upstanding’ and ‘nefarious’ presentists. Upstanding presentists aim to meet the challenge, positing presently existing truth-makers for truths about the past; nefarious presentists aim to shirk their responsibilities, using the language of truth-maker theory but without paying any ontological price. We argue that presentists should be nefarious presentists.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)355–371
Number of pages17
JournalThe Philosophical Quarterly
Issue number260
Early online date25 Jun 2015
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2015

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