Neither ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’ nor ‘Better’ in Terms of ‘Good’

Johan Eric Gustafsson

doi:10.1111/nous.12038

Neither ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’ nor ‘Better’ in Terms of ‘Good’

Johan Eric Gustafsson

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of intrinsic goodness or it breaks down in cases where both of the relata of ‘better’ are bad.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	466-473
Number of pages	8
Journal	Noûs
Volume	48
Issue number	3
Early online date	21 Jul 2013
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12038
Publication status	Published - 2014

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10.1111/nous.12038

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nous.12038/abstract;jsessionid=B6DCC1622F4585DEDAC636E01B4BCAB3.f03t04

Cite this

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title = "Neither {\textquoteleft}Good{\textquoteright} in Terms of {\textquoteleft}Better{\textquoteright} nor {\textquoteleft}Better{\textquoteright} in Terms of {\textquoteleft}Good{\textquoteright}",

abstract = "In this paper, I argue against defining either of {\textquoteleft}good{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}better{\textquoteright} in terms of the other. According to definitions of {\textquoteleft}good{\textquoteright} in terms of {\textquoteleft}better{\textquoteright}, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of {\textquoteleft}better{\textquoteright} without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining {\textquoteleft}better{\textquoteright} in terms of {\textquoteleft}good{\textquoteright}, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of intrinsic goodness or it breaks down in cases where both of the relata of {\textquoteleft}better{\textquoteright} are bad.",

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AB - In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of intrinsic goodness or it breaks down in cases where both of the relata of ‘better’ are bad.

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