Neither ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’ nor ‘Better’ in Terms of ‘Good’

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of intrinsic goodness or it breaks down in cases where both of the relata of ‘better’ are bad.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)466-473
Number of pages8
Issue number3
Early online date21 Jul 2013
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Cite this