Abstract
This paper argues that from the distinct questions posed at Philebus 15b, the second one (Philebus 15b2-4) creates a genuine philosophical difficulty, and one Plato was right to regard as exacerbated by unchangingness. Not being liable to change does make it philosophically and practically more difficult to regard a multiplicity as a unity, and to determine the multiplicity within a unity. Moreover, addressing this difficulty is central to moving forward in the debate over pleasure and reason in the good human life. The article uses the clear parallel with the Sophist to argue that this is a philosophical problem that Plato should have; and that it is natural for him to cast it in terms of unchangingness.
| Original language | English |
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| Pages (from-to) | 103-129 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| Journal | Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy / Philosophiegeschichte und Logische Analyse |
| Volume | 12 |
| Publication status | Published - 2009 |