Noise and bias in eliciting preferences

John D. Hey, Andrea Morone, Ulrich Schmidt

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In the context of eliciting preferences for decision making under risk, we analyse the features of four different elicitation methods-pairwise choice, willingness-to-pay, willingness-to-accept, and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism-and estimate noise, bias and risk attitudes for two different preference functionals, Expected Utility and Rank-Dependent Expected Utility. It is well-known that methods differ in terms of the bias in the elicitation; it is rather less well-known that methods differ in terms of their noisiness. It has also been reported that risk attitudes are not stable across different elicitation methods. Our results suggest that elicited preferences should only be used in the context in which they were elicited, and the bias in the certainty-equivalent methods should be kept in mind when making predictions based on the elicited preferences. Moreover, conclusions should be moderated to take into account the various methods' noise, which is generally lowest in the case of pairwise choice.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)213-235
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Risk and Uncertainty
Volume39
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2009

Keywords

  • Pairwise choice
  • Willingness-to-pay
  • Willingness-to-accept
  • BDM mechanism
  • Errors
  • Noise
  • Biases
  • EXPECTED UTILITY-THEORY
  • SEALED-BID AUCTIONS
  • RISKY CHOICE
  • PROSPECT-THEORY
  • DISPARITY
  • ERROR
  • WILLINGNESS
  • UNCERTAINTY
  • INCENTIVES
  • DECISIONS

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