Non-cooperation by popular vote: expectations, foreign intervention, and the vote in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Standard

Non-cooperation by popular vote : expectations, foreign intervention, and the vote in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum. / Jurado, Ignacio; Walter, Stefanie; Dinas, Elias; Konstantinidis, Nikitas.

In: International Organization, Vol. 72, No. 4, 01.09.2018, p. 969-994.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Jurado, I, Walter, S, Dinas, E & Konstantinidis, N 2018, 'Non-cooperation by popular vote: expectations, foreign intervention, and the vote in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum', International Organization, vol. 72, no. 4, pp. 969-994. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000255

APA

Jurado, I., Walter, S., Dinas, E., & Konstantinidis, N. (2018). Non-cooperation by popular vote: expectations, foreign intervention, and the vote in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum. International Organization, 72(4), 969-994. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000255

Vancouver

Jurado I, Walter S, Dinas E, Konstantinidis N. Non-cooperation by popular vote: expectations, foreign intervention, and the vote in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum. International Organization. 2018 Sep 1;72(4):969-994. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000255

Author

Jurado, Ignacio ; Walter, Stefanie ; Dinas, Elias ; Konstantinidis, Nikitas. / Non-cooperation by popular vote : expectations, foreign intervention, and the vote in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum. In: International Organization. 2018 ; Vol. 72, No. 4. pp. 969-994.

Bibtex - Download

@article{1ba677f66d6a4e7fbaeb68081a76d185,
title = "Non-cooperation by popular vote: expectations, foreign intervention, and the vote in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum",
abstract = "When popular referendums fail to ratify new international agreements or succeed in reversing existing ones, it not only affects domestic voters but also creates negative spillovers for the other parties to such agreements. We explore how voters respond to this strategic environment. We use original survey data from a poll fielded just one day before the 2015 Greek bailout referendum - a referendum in which the stakes for other countries were particularly high - to investigate how expectations about the likely foreign response to a noncooperative referendum outcome influence voting behavior and to what extent foreign policymakers can influence those expectations. Our analysis of the Greek referendum shows that such expectations had a powerful effect on voting behavior: voters expecting that a noncooperative referendum outcome would force Greece to leave the eurozone were substantially more likely to vote cooperatively than those believing that it would result in renewed negotiations with the country's creditors. Leveraging the bank closure that took place right before the vote, we also show that costly signals by foreign actors made voters more pessimistic about the consequences of a noncooperative vote and substantially increased the share of cooperative votes.",
author = "Ignacio Jurado and Stefanie Walter and Elias Dinas and Nikitas Konstantinidis",
year = "2018",
month = sep,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1017/S0020818318000255",
language = "English",
volume = "72",
pages = "969--994",
journal = "International Organization",
number = "4",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Non-cooperation by popular vote

T2 - expectations, foreign intervention, and the vote in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum

AU - Jurado, Ignacio

AU - Walter, Stefanie

AU - Dinas, Elias

AU - Konstantinidis, Nikitas

PY - 2018/9/1

Y1 - 2018/9/1

N2 - When popular referendums fail to ratify new international agreements or succeed in reversing existing ones, it not only affects domestic voters but also creates negative spillovers for the other parties to such agreements. We explore how voters respond to this strategic environment. We use original survey data from a poll fielded just one day before the 2015 Greek bailout referendum - a referendum in which the stakes for other countries were particularly high - to investigate how expectations about the likely foreign response to a noncooperative referendum outcome influence voting behavior and to what extent foreign policymakers can influence those expectations. Our analysis of the Greek referendum shows that such expectations had a powerful effect on voting behavior: voters expecting that a noncooperative referendum outcome would force Greece to leave the eurozone were substantially more likely to vote cooperatively than those believing that it would result in renewed negotiations with the country's creditors. Leveraging the bank closure that took place right before the vote, we also show that costly signals by foreign actors made voters more pessimistic about the consequences of a noncooperative vote and substantially increased the share of cooperative votes.

AB - When popular referendums fail to ratify new international agreements or succeed in reversing existing ones, it not only affects domestic voters but also creates negative spillovers for the other parties to such agreements. We explore how voters respond to this strategic environment. We use original survey data from a poll fielded just one day before the 2015 Greek bailout referendum - a referendum in which the stakes for other countries were particularly high - to investigate how expectations about the likely foreign response to a noncooperative referendum outcome influence voting behavior and to what extent foreign policymakers can influence those expectations. Our analysis of the Greek referendum shows that such expectations had a powerful effect on voting behavior: voters expecting that a noncooperative referendum outcome would force Greece to leave the eurozone were substantially more likely to vote cooperatively than those believing that it would result in renewed negotiations with the country's creditors. Leveraging the bank closure that took place right before the vote, we also show that costly signals by foreign actors made voters more pessimistic about the consequences of a noncooperative vote and substantially increased the share of cooperative votes.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85049318497&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1017/S0020818318000255

DO - 10.1017/S0020818318000255

M3 - Article

VL - 72

SP - 969

EP - 994

JO - International Organization

JF - International Organization

IS - 4

ER -