Not old... but not that new either: Explicability, Emergence and the Characterisation of Materialism

TY - CHAP

T1 - Not old... but not that new either: Explicability, Emergence and the Characterisation of Materialism

AU - Noordhof, Paul Jonathan Pitt

PY - 2003

Y1 - 2003

N2 - Supervenience formulations of 'physicalism' have come under attack for being unable to distinguish 'physicalism' from 'British emergentism' and 'ethical non-naturalism'. An appeal to the notion of one level of properties explicating another is said to be necessary. In response, I argue that strong supervenience with the first operator that of nomological necessity and the second that of metaphysical necessity does the job. I consider the claim that materialism formulated in my favored way does not capture the asymmetric dependence of the broadly physical on the physical as identified by physics. I argue that this failure does not undermine the formulation. Finally, I consider the claim that my formulation fails to capture other distinctive features of physicalism, for instance, that the only basic causal properties are basic physical properties and that the only fundamental laws are the laws of physics. I present a dilemma. Understand 'fundamental' one way and my proposal captures the idea. Understand it another way and it's not essential to the proper characterization of physicalism.

AB - Supervenience formulations of 'physicalism' have come under attack for being unable to distinguish 'physicalism' from 'British emergentism' and 'ethical non-naturalism'. An appeal to the notion of one level of properties explicating another is said to be necessary. In response, I argue that strong supervenience with the first operator that of nomological necessity and the second that of metaphysical necessity does the job. I consider the claim that materialism formulated in my favored way does not capture the asymmetric dependence of the broadly physical on the physical as identified by physics. I argue that this failure does not undermine the formulation. Finally, I consider the claim that my formulation fails to capture other distinctive features of physicalism, for instance, that the only basic causal properties are basic physical properties and that the only fundamental laws are the laws of physics. I present a dilemma. Understand 'fundamental' one way and my proposal captures the idea. Understand it another way and it's not essential to the proper characterization of physicalism.

M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

SN - 0-907-84547-9

SP - 85

EP - 108

BT - Physicalism and Mental Causation

A2 - Walter, Sven

A2 - Heckman, Heinz-Dieter

PB - Imprint Academic

CY - Charlottesville

ER -