On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players

Anindya Bhattacharya, Abderrahmane Ziad

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In this paper we first explore the predictive power of the solution notion called conservative stable standard of behaviour (CSSB), introduced by Greenberg (The theory of social situations, 1990), in environments with farsighted players (as modelled in Xue, Econ Theory 11:603–627, 1998) as intuitively it is quite nice. Unfortunately, we find that CSSB has a number of undesirable properties: most importantly, it makes vacuous predictions for most natural social environments. Therefore, we introduce an intuitive refinement of this solution which we call conservative stable weak predictor. In settings of proper voting games, we explore some existence properties of this new solution and also show that it may not be unique. However, unfortunately, this refinement may also lead to non-intuitive vacuous predictions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)537-552
Number of pages15
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2012

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