On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions

Jack Robles; Makoto Shimoji

doi:10.1515/1935-1704.1829

On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions

Jack Robles, Makoto Shimoji

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We extend Dekel and Wolinsky's (2003) result on private-value first price auctions by providing different sufficient conditions under which each player has a unique rationalizable bid conditional on her value. Unlike Dekel and Wolinsky's, our result does not necessarily require a large number of players. If values are independently distributed, (i) our conditions are weaker than Dekel and Wolinsky's, and (ii) our conditions require a large number of players only if the distributions on values has a low reverse hazard rate for some value. Our result holds for the cases where players' utility functions are concave or values are not identically distributed.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1935-1704
Journal	The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Volume	12
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1829
Publication status	Published - 2012

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10.1515/1935-1704.1829

http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2012.12.issue-1/1935-1704.1829/1935-1704.1829.xml

Cite this

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