On the Equal Division Core

A Bhattacharya

doi:10.1007/s00355-003-0221-2

On the Equal Division Core

A Bhattacharya

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The Equal Division Core (EDC) of a transferable utility cooperative game (TU game) is the set of efficient pay-off vectors for the grand coalition which are not blocked by the equal division allocation for any sub-coalition. Our objective is to provide an axiomatic characterization of the EDC as a solution of TU games.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	391-399
Number of pages	9
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	22
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0221-2
Publication status	Published - Apr 2004

Keywords

EGALITARIAN SOLUTION
CONVEX GAMES
AXIOMATIZATION

Access to Document

10.1007/s00355-003-0221-2

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0221-2

Cite this

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title = "On the Equal Division Core",

abstract = "The Equal Division Core (EDC) of a transferable utility cooperative game (TU game) is the set of efficient pay-off vectors for the grand coalition which are not blocked by the equal division allocation for any sub-coalition. Our objective is to provide an axiomatic characterization of the EDC as a solution of TU games.",

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AB - The Equal Division Core (EDC) of a transferable utility cooperative game (TU game) is the set of efficient pay-off vectors for the grand coalition which are not blocked by the equal division allocation for any sub-coalition. Our objective is to provide an axiomatic characterization of the EDC as a solution of TU games.

KW - EGALITARIAN SOLUTION

KW - CONVEX GAMES

KW - AXIOMATIZATION

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M3 - Article

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JO - Social Choice and Welfare

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