Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium

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Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. / Shimoji, Makoto.

In: Games and Economic Behaviour, Vol. 75, No. 1, 05.2012, p. 441-447.

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Harvard

Shimoji, M 2012, 'Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium', Games and Economic Behaviour, vol. 75, no. 1, pp. 441-447. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.010

APA

Shimoji, M. (2012). Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. Games and Economic Behaviour, 75(1), 441-447. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.010

Vancouver

Shimoji M. Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. Games and Economic Behaviour. 2012 May;75(1):441-447. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.010

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Shimoji, Makoto. / Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. In: Games and Economic Behaviour. 2012 ; Vol. 75, No. 1. pp. 441-447.

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@article{6cc77e9b343148ee91c9ade391904c22,
title = "Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium",
abstract = "We introduce a condition, Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibrium. If beliefs are assumed to be independent and unitary, Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium are outcome-equivalent. We show that the set of Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibria and the set of self-confirming equilibria which are outcome-equivalent to Nash equilibria coincide. Our condition identifies the collection of information sets and requires the existence of beliefs shared by (certain sets of) players regarding these information sets. If the information sets are off the equilibrium path, the beliefs regarding them do not have to be correct. Our condition is weaker than that of strongly consistent self-confirming equilibrium by Kamada (2010).",
author = "Makoto Shimoji",
year = "2012",
month = "5",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.010",
language = "English",
volume = "75",
pages = "441--447",
journal = "Games and Economic Behaviour",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "1",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium

AU - Shimoji, Makoto

PY - 2012/5

Y1 - 2012/5

N2 - We introduce a condition, Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibrium. If beliefs are assumed to be independent and unitary, Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium are outcome-equivalent. We show that the set of Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibria and the set of self-confirming equilibria which are outcome-equivalent to Nash equilibria coincide. Our condition identifies the collection of information sets and requires the existence of beliefs shared by (certain sets of) players regarding these information sets. If the information sets are off the equilibrium path, the beliefs regarding them do not have to be correct. Our condition is weaker than that of strongly consistent self-confirming equilibrium by Kamada (2010).

AB - We introduce a condition, Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibrium. If beliefs are assumed to be independent and unitary, Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium are outcome-equivalent. We show that the set of Nash-equivalent self-confirming equilibria and the set of self-confirming equilibria which are outcome-equivalent to Nash equilibria coincide. Our condition identifies the collection of information sets and requires the existence of beliefs shared by (certain sets of) players regarding these information sets. If the information sets are off the equilibrium path, the beliefs regarding them do not have to be correct. Our condition is weaker than that of strongly consistent self-confirming equilibrium by Kamada (2010).

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84859899199&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.010

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.010

M3 - Article

VL - 75

SP - 441

EP - 447

JO - Games and Economic Behaviour

JF - Games and Economic Behaviour

SN - 0899-8256

IS - 1

ER -