Abstract
I argue that the externalist's response to the McKinsey-Brown argument should be as follows. First, nothing you have said persuades me that I must know a priori that I am agnostic about the concept of A but, second, even if I'm wrong, that's not a problem because you need me to know a priori that I haven't manufactured the concept of A at the same time and that is not at all plausible. However, third, suppose I give you this, then it still doesn't follow that you threaten my position. The conviction upon which you trade, namely that we can't find out things about the external world a priori, either establishes that the truth of externalism is not a priori (in which case, fair enough) or is false when it is realised what 'finding out' comes to in this context.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 48-56 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Analysis |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2004 |