Outsmarting the McKinsey-Brown Argument

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I argue that the externalist's response to the McKinsey-Brown argument should be as follows. First, nothing you have said persuades me that I must know a priori that I am agnostic about the concept of A but, second, even if I'm wrong, that's not a problem because you need me to know a priori that I haven't manufactured the concept of A at the same time and that is not at all plausible. However, third, suppose I give you this, then it still doesn't follow that you threaten my position. The conviction upon which you trade, namely that we can't find out things about the external world a priori, either establishes that the truth of externalism is not a priori (in which case, fair enough) or is false when it is realised what 'finding out' comes to in this context.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)48-56
Number of pages9
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2004

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