Particularism and the structure of reasons

C. Piller

doi:10.1007/s12136-006-1006-x

Particularism and the structure of reasons

C. Piller

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

I argue that particularism (or holism) about reasons, i.e., the view that a feature that is a reason in one case need not be a reason in another case, is true, but uninterestingly so. Its truth is best explained by principles that govern a weaker notion than that of being a reason: one thing can be ‘normatively connected’ to something else without its being a reason for what it is normatively connected to. Thus, even though true, particularism about reasons does not support the particularist’s general idea that the normative domain is not governed by principles.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	87-102
Number of pages	15
Journal	Acta Analytica
Volume	21
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1006-x
Publication status	Published - Jun 2006

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10.1007/s12136-006-1006-x

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1006-x

Cite this

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title = "Particularism and the structure of reasons",

abstract = "I argue that particularism (or holism) about reasons, i.e., the view that a feature that is a reason in one case need not be a reason in another case, is true, but uninterestingly so. Its truth is best explained by principles that govern a weaker notion than that of being a reason: one thing can be {\textquoteleft}normatively connected{\textquoteright} to something else without its being a reason for what it is normatively connected to. Thus, even though true, particularism about reasons does not support the particularist{\textquoteright}s general idea that the normative domain is not governed by principles.",

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