Particularism and the structure of reasons

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I argue that particularism (or holism) about reasons, i.e., the view that a feature that is a reason in one case need not be a reason in another case, is true, but uninterestingly so. Its truth is best explained by principles that govern a weaker notion than that of being a reason: one thing can be ‘normatively connected’ to something else without its being a reason for what it is normatively connected to. Thus, even though true, particularism about reasons does not support the particularist’s general idea that the normative domain is not governed by principles.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)87-102
Number of pages15
JournalActa Analytica
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2006

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