By the same authors

Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government

Research output: Working paper

Standard

Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government. / Pickering, Andrew Christopher; Maloney, John.

Bristol, UK : Centre for Market and Public Organisation, 2010. p. 1-45 (The Centre for Market and Public Organization Working Paper series; Vol. 10, No. 252).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Pickering, AC & Maloney, J 2010 'Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government' The Centre for Market and Public Organization Working Paper series, no. 252, vol. 10, Centre for Market and Public Organisation, Bristol, UK, pp. 1-45. <http://www.bris.ac.uk/cmpo/publications/papers/2010/wp252.pdf>

APA

Pickering, A. C., & Maloney, J. (2010). Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government. (pp. 1-45). (The Centre for Market and Public Organization Working Paper series; Vol. 10, No. 252). Centre for Market and Public Organisation. http://www.bris.ac.uk/cmpo/publications/papers/2010/wp252.pdf

Vancouver

Pickering AC, Maloney J. Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government. Bristol, UK: Centre for Market and Public Organisation. 2010 Dec 1, p. 1-45. (The Centre for Market and Public Organization Working Paper series; 252).

Author

Pickering, Andrew Christopher ; Maloney, John. / Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government. Bristol, UK : Centre for Market and Public Organisation, 2010. pp. 1-45 (The Centre for Market and Public Organization Working Paper series; 252).

Bibtex - Download

@techreport{2cb46d618831452583e2b088aa3728ff,
title = "Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government",
abstract = "We study the formation of government policy in democracies when turnout depends on party activists and campaign spending - parties{\textquoteright} {\textquoteleft}political capital{\textquoteright}. The functional importance of political capital determines equilibrium rent-seeking in government. Often the more potent political capital is the greater the extent of rent-seeking. Limiting the level of political capital is distinct from reducing its potency, and whereas we find a strong case for reducing potency we find that placing limits on campaign spending are rarely optimal, and in particular that weak limits are never optimal. A limit on total campaign spending can increase government quality under certain conditions and if so then strong limits are always better than weak limits. However, finite limits on either national or local campaign spending alone, as often seen in practice, are never optimal.",
keywords = "Party activists, campaign funding, rent-seeking, political finance",
author = "Pickering, {Andrew Christopher} and John Maloney",
year = "2010",
month = dec,
day = "1",
language = "English",
isbn = "1473-625X",
volume = "10",
series = "The Centre for Market and Public Organization Working Paper series",
publisher = "Centre for Market and Public Organisation",
number = "252",
pages = "1--45",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Centre for Market and Public Organisation",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - UNPB

T1 - Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government

AU - Pickering, Andrew Christopher

AU - Maloney, John

PY - 2010/12/1

Y1 - 2010/12/1

N2 - We study the formation of government policy in democracies when turnout depends on party activists and campaign spending - parties’ ‘political capital’. The functional importance of political capital determines equilibrium rent-seeking in government. Often the more potent political capital is the greater the extent of rent-seeking. Limiting the level of political capital is distinct from reducing its potency, and whereas we find a strong case for reducing potency we find that placing limits on campaign spending are rarely optimal, and in particular that weak limits are never optimal. A limit on total campaign spending can increase government quality under certain conditions and if so then strong limits are always better than weak limits. However, finite limits on either national or local campaign spending alone, as often seen in practice, are never optimal.

AB - We study the formation of government policy in democracies when turnout depends on party activists and campaign spending - parties’ ‘political capital’. The functional importance of political capital determines equilibrium rent-seeking in government. Often the more potent political capital is the greater the extent of rent-seeking. Limiting the level of political capital is distinct from reducing its potency, and whereas we find a strong case for reducing potency we find that placing limits on campaign spending are rarely optimal, and in particular that weak limits are never optimal. A limit on total campaign spending can increase government quality under certain conditions and if so then strong limits are always better than weak limits. However, finite limits on either national or local campaign spending alone, as often seen in practice, are never optimal.

KW - Party activists, campaign funding, rent-seeking, political finance

M3 - Working paper

SN - 1473-625X

VL - 10

T3 - The Centre for Market and Public Organization Working Paper series

SP - 1

EP - 45

BT - Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government

PB - Centre for Market and Public Organisation

CY - Bristol, UK

ER -