By the same authors

Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government. / Maloney, John; Pickering, Andrew Christopher.

In: Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 29, No. 1, 02.2013, p. 210-238.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Maloney, J & Pickering, AC 2013, 'Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 210-238. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewr030

APA

Maloney, J., & Pickering, A. C. (2013). Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 29(1), 210-238. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewr030

Vancouver

Maloney J, Pickering AC. Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 2013 Feb;29(1):210-238. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewr030

Author

Maloney, John ; Pickering, Andrew Christopher. / Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government. In: Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 2013 ; Vol. 29, No. 1. pp. 210-238.

Bibtex - Download

@article{f51ac36d6c2e4ee4bb9bab6869007730,
title = "Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government",
abstract = "We study the formation of government policy in democracies when turnout depends on party activists and campaign spending -- parties' `political capital'. The functional importance of political capital determines equilibrium rent-seeking in government. If activists and donors are better than the ordinary voter at distinguishing between good governments and lucky governments, then the more potent political capital is the less the extent of rent-seeking. This situation also rules out finite limits on election spending, though a zero limit could be the optimum if donors and activists are close enough substitutes in the work they do for the party. The one policy which is never optimal is a finite limit on local spending.",
author = "John Maloney and Pickering, {Andrew Christopher}",
year = "2013",
month = "2",
doi = "10.1093/jleo/ewr030",
language = "English",
volume = "29",
pages = "210--238",
journal = "Journal of Law, Economics and Organization",
issn = "8756-6222",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government

AU - Maloney, John

AU - Pickering, Andrew Christopher

PY - 2013/2

Y1 - 2013/2

N2 - We study the formation of government policy in democracies when turnout depends on party activists and campaign spending -- parties' `political capital'. The functional importance of political capital determines equilibrium rent-seeking in government. If activists and donors are better than the ordinary voter at distinguishing between good governments and lucky governments, then the more potent political capital is the less the extent of rent-seeking. This situation also rules out finite limits on election spending, though a zero limit could be the optimum if donors and activists are close enough substitutes in the work they do for the party. The one policy which is never optimal is a finite limit on local spending.

AB - We study the formation of government policy in democracies when turnout depends on party activists and campaign spending -- parties' `political capital'. The functional importance of political capital determines equilibrium rent-seeking in government. If activists and donors are better than the ordinary voter at distinguishing between good governments and lucky governments, then the more potent political capital is the less the extent of rent-seeking. This situation also rules out finite limits on election spending, though a zero limit could be the optimum if donors and activists are close enough substitutes in the work they do for the party. The one policy which is never optimal is a finite limit on local spending.

U2 - 10.1093/jleo/ewr030

DO - 10.1093/jleo/ewr030

M3 - Article

VL - 29

SP - 210

EP - 238

JO - Journal of Law, Economics and Organization

JF - Journal of Law, Economics and Organization

SN - 8756-6222

IS - 1

ER -