Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government

Andrew Christopher Pickering; John Maloney

Party Activists, Campaign Funding and the Quality of Government

Andrew Christopher Pickering
, John Maloney

Economics

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

We study the formation of government policy in democracies when turnout depends on party activists and campaign spending - parties’ ‘political capital’. The functional importance of political capital determines equilibrium rent-seeking in government. Often the more potent political capital is the greater the extent of rent-seeking. Limiting the level of political capital is distinct from reducing its potency, and whereas we find a strong case for reducing potency we find that placing limits on campaign spending are rarely optimal, and in particular that weak limits are never optimal. A limit on total campaign spending can increase government quality under certain conditions and if so then strong limits are always better than weak limits. However, finite limits on either national or local campaign spending alone, as often seen in practice, are never optimal.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	Bristol, UK
Publisher	Centre for Market and Public Organisation
Pages	1-45
Number of pages	45
Volume	10
ISBN (Electronic)	1473-625X
ISBN (Print)	1473-625X
Publication status	Published - 1 Dec 2010

Publication series

Name	The Centre for Market and Public Organization Working Paper series
Publisher	Centre for Market and Public Organisation, Bristol Institute of Public Affairs, University of Bristol
No.	252
Volume	10
ISSN (Print)	1473-625X
ISSN (Electronic)	1473-625X

Keywords

Party activists, campaign funding, rent-seeking, political finance

Access to Document

http://www.bris.ac.uk/cmpo/publications/papers/2010/wp252.pdf

Embargoed Document

Wp252
Accepted author manuscript, 455 KB

Cite this

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