Paying for the quantity and quality of hospital care: the foundations and evolution of payment policy in England

Katja Grasic; Anne R Mason; Andrew Street

doi:10.1186/s13561-015-0050-x

Paying for the quantity and quality of hospital care: the foundations and evolution of payment policy in England

Katja Grasic, Anne R Mason, Andrew Street

Centre for Health Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Prospective payment arrangements are now the main form of hospital funding in most developed countries. An essential component of such arrangements is the classification system used to differentiate patients according to their expected resource requirements. In this article we describe the evolution and structure of Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) in England and the way in which costs are calculated for patients allocated to each HRG. We then describe how payments are made, how policy has evolved to incentivise improvements in quality, and how prospective payment is being applied outside hospital settings.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-10
Number of pages	10
Journal	Health Economics Review
Volume	5
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1186/s13561-015-0050-x
Publication status	Published - 12 Jun 2015

Access to Document

10.1186/s13561-015-0050-x

KG AM AS Payng quantty & qualty hosp care Hlth Econ Rev 5 15 2015
© Grašič et al. 2015
Final published version, 748 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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