Abstract
This paper argues that attempts to apply Alasdair MacIntyre's positive moral theory to business ethics are problematic, due to the cognitive closure of MacIntyre's concept of a practice. I begin by outlining the notion of a practice, before turning to Moore's attempt to provide a MacIntyrean account of corporate governance. I argue that Moore's attempt is mismatched with MacIntyre's account of moral education. Because the notion of practices resists general application I go on to argue that a negative application, which focuses on regulation, is more plausible. Large-scale regulation, usually thought antithetical to MacIntyre's advocacy of small-scale politics, has the potential to facilitate practice-based work and reveals that MacIntyre's own work can be used against his pessimism about the modern order. Furthermore, the conception of regulation I defend can show us how management is more amenable to ethical understanding than MacIntyre's work is often taken to imply.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 229-249 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Business Ethics Quarterly |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Apr 2014 |
Keywords
- MacIntyre
- Management
- Practices
- Regulation
- Virtue-ethics
