Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States

Richard Nolan; John Armour; Bernard Black; Brian Cheffins

doi:10.1111/j.1740-1461.2009.01157.x

Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States

Richard Nolan, John Armour, Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins

York Law School

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

It is often assumed that strong securities markets require good legal protection of minority shareholders. This implies both “good” law—principally, corporate and securities law—and enforcement, yet there has been little empirical analysis of enforcement. We study private enforcement of corporate law in two common-law jurisdictions with highly developed stock markets, the United Kingdom and the United States, examining how often directors of publicly traded companies are sued, and the nature and outcomes of those suits. We find, based a comprehensive search for filings over 2004–2006, that lawsuits against directors of public companies alleging breach of duty are nearly nonexistent in the United Kingdom. The United States is more litigious, but we still find, based on a nationwide search of court decisions between 2000–2007, that only a small percentage of public companies face a lawsuit against directors alleging a breach of duty that is sufficiently contentious to result in a reported judicial opinion, and a substantial fraction of these cases are dismissed. We examine possible substitutes in the United Kingdom for formal private enforcement of corporate law and find some evidence of substitutes, especially for takeover litigation. Nonetheless, our results suggest that formal private enforcement of corporate law is less central to strong securities markets than might be anticipated.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	687-722
Number of pages	36
Journal	Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
Volume	6
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2009.01157.x
Publication status	Published - Dec 2009

Keywords

Corporate law
directors duties
enforcement

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10.1111/j.1740-1461.2009.01157.x

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2009.01157.x/abstract

Cite this

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title = "Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States",

abstract = "It is often assumed that strong securities markets require good legal protection of minority shareholders. This implies both “good” law—principally, corporate and securities law—and enforcement, yet there has been little empirical analysis of enforcement. We study private enforcement of corporate law in two common-law jurisdictions with highly developed stock markets, the United Kingdom and the United States, examining how often directors of publicly traded companies are sued, and the nature and outcomes of those suits. We find, based a comprehensive search for filings over 2004–2006, that lawsuits against directors of public companies alleging breach of duty are nearly nonexistent in the United Kingdom. The United States is more litigious, but we still find, based on a nationwide search of court decisions between 2000–2007, that only a small percentage of public companies face a lawsuit against directors alleging a breach of duty that is sufficiently contentious to result in a reported judicial opinion, and a substantial fraction of these cases are dismissed. We examine possible substitutes in the United Kingdom for formal private enforcement of corporate law and find some evidence of substitutes, especially for takeover litigation. Nonetheless, our results suggest that formal private enforcement of corporate law is less central to strong securities markets than might be anticipated.",

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N2 - It is often assumed that strong securities markets require good legal protection of minority shareholders. This implies both “good” law—principally, corporate and securities law—and enforcement, yet there has been little empirical analysis of enforcement. We study private enforcement of corporate law in two common-law jurisdictions with highly developed stock markets, the United Kingdom and the United States, examining how often directors of publicly traded companies are sued, and the nature and outcomes of those suits. We find, based a comprehensive search for filings over 2004–2006, that lawsuits against directors of public companies alleging breach of duty are nearly nonexistent in the United Kingdom. The United States is more litigious, but we still find, based on a nationwide search of court decisions between 2000–2007, that only a small percentage of public companies face a lawsuit against directors alleging a breach of duty that is sufficiently contentious to result in a reported judicial opinion, and a substantial fraction of these cases are dismissed. We examine possible substitutes in the United Kingdom for formal private enforcement of corporate law and find some evidence of substitutes, especially for takeover litigation. Nonetheless, our results suggest that formal private enforcement of corporate law is less central to strong securities markets than might be anticipated.

AB - It is often assumed that strong securities markets require good legal protection of minority shareholders. This implies both “good” law—principally, corporate and securities law—and enforcement, yet there has been little empirical analysis of enforcement. We study private enforcement of corporate law in two common-law jurisdictions with highly developed stock markets, the United Kingdom and the United States, examining how often directors of publicly traded companies are sued, and the nature and outcomes of those suits. We find, based a comprehensive search for filings over 2004–2006, that lawsuits against directors of public companies alleging breach of duty are nearly nonexistent in the United Kingdom. The United States is more litigious, but we still find, based on a nationwide search of court decisions between 2000–2007, that only a small percentage of public companies face a lawsuit against directors alleging a breach of duty that is sufficiently contentious to result in a reported judicial opinion, and a substantial fraction of these cases are dismissed. We examine possible substitutes in the United Kingdom for formal private enforcement of corporate law and find some evidence of substitutes, especially for takeover litigation. Nonetheless, our results suggest that formal private enforcement of corporate law is less central to strong securities markets than might be anticipated.

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